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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses whether we should grant moral consideration 
to robots. Contemporary approaches in support of doing so centers 
around a relational appearance based approach, which takes 
departure in the fact that we already by now enter into ethical 
demanding relations with (even simplistic) robots as if they had a 
mind of their own. Hence, it is assumed that moral status can be 
viewed as socially constructed and negotiated within relations. 
However, I argue that a relational turn risks turning the as if into if 
at the cost of losing sight of what matters in human-human 
relations. Therefore, I stick to a human centered framework and 
introduce a moral philosophical perspective, primarily based on 
Kant’s Tugendlehre and his conception of duties as well as the 
Formula of Humanity, which also holds a relational perspective. 
This enables me to discuss preliminary arguments for moral 
considerations of robots. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K4 [Computers and Society]: Ethics. 
General Terms 
Design,Theory. 
Keywords 
Moral consideration, ethics of robotics, duties, as if. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent report on lethal autonomous robot systems, Heynes 
points to that personhood is what links moral agency to 
responsibility [11]. But is that necessarily the case, or is Heynes 
being species chauvinistic? The answer could well be a yes, since 
robots have started to come into our social lives and we interact 
with them in human-like ways, as if they had inner mental states. 
On this background, it seems that we have good reasons to dwell 
upon our concepts of moral 
agency and patiency. Especially since our interactions with, and 
reactions towards, robots also concerns our self-image. First, I 
discuss the possibilities of artificial moral agency and patiency 
and explore whether this counts in favour of anchoring the 
question of moral status in phenomenological observations of how 
we form relations with robots; the so called relational turn, 
favoured by Coeckelbergh [3] and Gunkel [9], who summarizes 
the idea as an alternative to standard explanations, which sets out 
to decide, who (or what) deserves moral standing on the basis of 
ascribing properties to the entity in question. Hence, according to 
Gunkel, the relational “..alternative [..] approaches moral status 
not as an essential property of things but as something that is 
socially negotiated and constructed in face of others.” ([10]:13) 
I sympathize with the relational turn, but still find that it is 
challenged by the fact that, over time, our human-human relations 
may be obscured by human-robot relations. Currently, it may 
seem reasonable to skip discussions about what a robot really is 
and instead focus on how it appears to us and how we engage with 
it by applying as if  approaches. But in the long run, our 
experiences with robots may radically alter our Lebenswelt. Here, 
I’m in alignment with the ideas of Turkle [18], who fears that we 
may lose something of great importance if we turn to robots or 
even end up preferring robots over humans.  
For that reason, I outline a Kantian moral argument in 
emphasizing his treatment of duties in the doctrine of virtues, The 
Tugendlehre, which is presented in the second part of The 
Metaphysics of Morals [13]. Related to Kant’s analysis of duties, 
there is room for a relational perspective, which can be expressed 
via the Formula of Humanity. Moreover, I also make reference to 
virtue ethical reflections in general. Thereby, I am able to put 
forward preliminary arguments for granting degrees of moral 
consideration to robots without risking that we gradually lose 
sight of our folk intuition and lived experience with what it is to 
enter into social relations. As such, I prefer to stay within a human 
centered framework, even though I agree with the proponents of 
the relational turn that there are baffling problems inherent to this 
kind of mind-morality perspective. However, the mere fact that 
things are complicated and problems unsolved does not constitute 
a proper reason for rejecting a framework.  
2. ROBOTS IN THE MORAL SPHERE 
The role of robots in moral discourse has been widely debated 
both within science fiction, philosophy and science. Hence, The 
World Robot Declaration was issued in Japan in 2004 and within 
the last decade, humans have increasingly interacted with care 
bots, pet bots, robot toys and robots for various therapeutic 
purposes (see for instance [18], [6], [1]). 
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One of the first to include robots in the moral sphere was Asimov, 
who issued his famous laws of robotics, which he used in science 
fiction novels to illustrate ethical dilemma situations in human 
robot interaction. From an engineering point of view, in Moral 
Machines – Teaching Robots Right from Wrong, Wallach and 
Allen [21] present the promises of machine morality from an 
engineering perspective by distinguishing between top-down, 
bottom-up and hybrid approaches to programming morality. Here, 
the first mentioned system suggests the implementation of 
formalizations of a given moral philosophical theory, whereas a 
bottom-up system requires neural network models, which 
gradually build up moral understanding by trial and error based 
performance optimization techniques. However, pure bottom-up 
systems are challenged by the lack of a guiding ethical theory, and 
as such there is no guarantee that a robot will develop a preferred 
kind of moral maturity. On the other hand, a hybrid model, which 
Wallach and Allen speak in favour of, combines these ideas from 
a virtue ethical outlook: Here, artificial moral agency might be 
obtained by integrating bottom-up learning scaffolded by top-
down rules.  
By the same token, from a philosophical angle, Verbeek [20] 
grasps the possibility of artificial moral agency by viewing 
technologies as mediating devices, which serve as morally active 
in shaping human understanding and action in the world. 
Consequently, even though technological artifacts do not hold 
human-like intentions, it can make sense to refer to distributed or 
hybrid intentionality and hence assign intentionality to technology 
in the sense that technological artifacts may play a directing role 
in our actions and experiences ([20]:57). Correspondingly, in 
moving beyond an anthropocentric understanding of agency, 
Floridi and Sanders [8] reject free will and mental states as 
necessary conditions for moral agency. On the contrary, they 
argue that moral agency may be assigned to intelligent artificial 
agents (AAs) to the extent that such AAs are interactive, i.e., able 
to react to stimuli by changing state, and capable of adaptive 
behavior as well as autonomous responses to the environment. 
What matters is whether an agent can perform good or evil 
actions, that is, whether its actions are morally qualifiable 
([8]:371).  
If we include robots in the moral sphere by assigning moral 
agency and responsibility to them, a next reasonable step would 
be to discuss if the time has come where we ought to discuss 
whether robots are worthy of moral consideration? Among others, 
Gunkel thinks the answer to that question might be a yes. In The 
Machine Question – Critical Perspectives on AI; Robots, and 
Ethics, Gunkel [9] argues that already by now the term “person” 
has been stretched out to include non-human agents, such as 
corporations. As such, we might benefit from including machines 
into the category of persons. If we do so, the question arises 
whether the kind of responsibilities we have towards robots would 
be on pair with the kind of responsibilities we have towards 
animals, corporations or other human beings? 
A lot has been written about machine agency in trying to lay out 
how robots ought to treat humans. Typically interest centers on 
how we may protect ourselves from possible harm caused by 
robots. At the same time little has been said about machine 
patiency. ([9]:103]). Hence, according to Gunkel, a claim to moral 
consideration, or even rights, may arise based on our social 
interactions with robots. We design artificial companions with 
whom (or which) we do engage and bond. Our machines are no 
longer tools, but have instead gradually turned into social actors 
or social interactive objects. Consequently, it may be about time 
we begin to think about moral obligations towards robots, maybe 
even in the strong form of robot rights. The mere fact that Paro, 
the seal care robot, is not a consciousness being with inner mental 
states does not automatically justify that we should not grant 
moral consideration to Paro. Moreover, our ways of living with 
robots is not just about what we do with robots, but also concerns 
our self-perception – what do I become through the kind of 
relations I form with robots? 
A contrast to the relational view can be found in the work of 
Sparrow [17]. He presents a so-called Turing Triage Test which 
allows him to illustrate that we would always chose a human life 
over a robot’s life, regardless of how advanced the robot might be. 
The mere fact that we can never know what the robot is really 
feeling, and if it feels anything at all makes it implausible to talk 
about, for instance, ‘punishing’ a robot: “Our awareness of the 
reality of the inner lives of other people is a function of [..] “an 
attitude towards a soul””. ([17]:211). According to Sparrow, 
there exist an unbridgeable gap between reality and appearance 
([17]:210). 
On the other hand, Coeckelbergh, like Gunkel, suggests a 
relational turn and continues by arguing in favour of replacing 
“..the question about how “real” or how “moral” non-human 
agents are by the question about the moral significance of 
appearance.”([5]:181).  
He displays problems with what he coins “a property approach to 
moral status assignment”, which seems to rest on the assumption 
that we can settle issues about moral significance with reference 
to a set of properties (e.g., mental states, speech, consciousness, 
intentionality). In this manner, we can supposedly establish a firm 
ground for separating out entities worthy of moral standing. But, 
Coeckelbergh points to problems inherent in this line of argument. 
Especially, it appears to be impossible to establish which 
properties we exactly need in order to be able to assign moral 
status to an entity. Also, the whole endeavor is challenged by “the 
other minds problem” - i.e.; the fact that we can never know for 
sure anything about the inner lives of others. Instead, 
Coeckelbergh focuses on our perceptions of robots and the way 
this affects our interactions with such entities: 
“My suggestion is that we can permit ourselves to remain 
agnostic about what ‘really’ goes on ‘in’ there, and focus on the 
‘outer’, the interaction, and in particular on how this interaction 
is co-shaped and co-constituted by how AAs [artificial agents] 
appear to us, humans ([5]: 188) 
Coeckelbergh’s phenomenological conception reflects a relational 
perspective, which takes departure in the observation of our 
mutual dependency. This fundamental precondition – with which 
everyone is actually familiar – forms a central point in 
Coeckelberg’s so-called relational ontology, which assumes that 
“relations are prior to the relata”([3]:45), and thereby view 
robots and humans as “relational entities”. For that reason, 
Coeckelbergh emphasizes a social-relational approach to moral 
consideration ([4]:219). But, here, unlike Coeckelbergh, I shall be 
arguing that we need not lean against appearance in combination 
with a social relational ontology. Instead, I point to a Kantian 
outset, which emphasizes how we can have duties to others and 
with regard to non-humans. Before moving forward, I find it 
important to stress that this paper does nothing else than provide a 
tentative outline of my preliminary ideas. In that respect, and all 
though I have reservations towards their positions, I find the work 
of Coeckelbergh and Gunkel highly inspiring and thought 
provoking. 
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3. AS IF 
Appearance is closely related to  the notion of ‘as if’, which is 
also explicitly noted by Coeckelbergh in mentioning that we 
interact with e.g., humanoid robots or artificial companions as if 
they could be trusted, blamed or loved. Therefore, Coeckelbergh 
calls for a phenomenological starting point in the investigation of 
human-robot relations, which takes departure in the “observed or 
imagined” human-robot relations ([5]:184). 
It makes good sense to turn to analogical reasoning or to introduce 
as if constructions when confronted with unfamiliar territory. This 
kind of idealization, or way of using representations as tools, has 
been given a thoroughly treatment in Vaihinger’s influential book 
The Philosophy of as if [19] in which he illustrates how fictions, 
i.e. as if-models and constructions may inform science and 
philosophy.  
Fictions are applied due to their utility, meaning that they are 
justifiable when proving useful in practice. But, they are not on 
pair with hypotheses, which can be proved or verified ([19]: xlii). 
Obviously, there are shades of pragmatism in Vaihinger’s work on 
the philosophy of as if. But we are not dealing with the pragmatic 
conception, which implies that what is useful to believe is true, 
since here “useful to believe” may involve both that which is true 
or false. In opposition to this, the guiding principle in Vaihinger’s 
philosophy is the observation that fictions are not just false but 
contradictory. Hence, fictions are errors, but fruitful errors. Yet, 
Vaihinger warns us that the use of fictions may also lead us 
astray, hence in legal practice women used to be treated as if they 
wore minor, which caused grave injustice ([19]:148). 
However, fictions are widely used in everyday thinking as well as 
in science, philosophy, economics, legal practice and in the 
description of abstract objects ect.. For instance, Vaihinger 
mentions Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which apply the 
fiction that human nature is driven by rational egoism. This fiction 
forms the foundation of Smith’s theory. Likewise, Also, Kant, in 
his treatment of rational agency, requires us to act as if we were 
free even though this is not the case in the real, phenomenal 
world. By the same token, the categorical imperative demands 
that you “act as if the principle of your action were, through your 
will, to become a general law of nature” ([19]:292). Hence, 
according to Kant, our vernunftbegriffe are fictions since they do 
not refer to objects in the world of experience [14]:KrV B799). 
Actually, in explaining the role of as if, Vaihinger points to the 
fact that the term “heuristic fictions” was coined by Kant: 
“Kant introduces a new term for what [..] he subsequently called 
“heuristic fictions”: he calls the ideas “regulative principles of 
pure reason”: they are not “constitutive” principles of reason, i.e. 
they do not give us the possibility of objective knowledge either 
within or outside the domain of experience, but serve “merely as 
rules” for understanding by indicating the path to be pursued 
within the domain of experience. By providing imaginary points 
on which it may direct its course but which can never be reached 
because it is outside reality.” ([19]:273) 
Also, Coeckelbergh notes that we can never have access to reality, 
mental states or the minds of others’. But, as noted above, instead 
of a mind morality approach, he suggests an alternative route. 
Rather than discussing the moral significance of either human or 
robot, we must turn to the study of appearance and relations in 
situations involving moral considerations in human-robot 
interactions ([4]:215). Consequently, when people, now or in a 
near future, start to treat humanoid robots as if they were moral 
agents, we could benefit from letting these observations guide our 
investigations by focusing on how humans experience and form 
interactions with robots through as if approaches.  
Nevertheless, according to Vaihinger, fictions are only justifiable, 
not probable hypotheses. As such, I doubt that we need to take a 
full relational turn and introduce a social relational ontology. To 
me, it seems that the relational as if approach is challenged by the 
fact that, over time, our human-human relations may be obscured 
by human-robot interactions. Currently, it might seem reasonable 
to skip discussions about what robots really are and instead focus 
on how they appear to us and how we engage with robots in social 
situations by applying as if  approaches and ascribe human-like 
agency to them. But in the long run, our experiences with robots 
may radically alter our Lebenswelt and by then we will no longer 
be able to make use of as if approaches, because we have 
forgotten what human-like relations are, that is: we have become 
unable to ‘measure’ experiences up against the benchmark of 
human relations. Here, I am in alignment with the ideas of Turkle 
[18], who fears that we may let go of fundamental values, such as 
trust and friendship, if we turn to robots or even end up preferring 
robots over humans: 
“At the robotic moment, we have to be concerned that the 
simplification and reduction of relationships is no longer 
something we complain about. It may become what we expect, 
even desire.”([18]:295). 
Likewise, if philosophers take departure in observed and imagined 
human-robot relations, they risk turning the as if into if ([19], 
[7]:9) and thereby lose sight of what originally constituted human-
human relations. 
4. A HUMAN CENTERED PERSPECTIVE  
In Robot Futures [16], Nourbakhsh describes a future scenario in 
which some kids act with great cruelty towards a robot dog. The 
scenario reminiscences about children’s abusive behavior towards 
animals, and the son in Nourbakhsh’s story remarks that: “These 
people…they’re sick. Let’s go home!” ([16]:54). By the same 
token, Nourbaksh reports a more recent experience with an 
autonomous tour-guide robot, which people would get great fun 
from teasing while it was guiding guests visiting a museum. 
Nobody seemed to care when it said: “please step out of my way”, 
it was not until the engineering team changed the phrase to also 
include the people being guided by the robot, that people’s 
attitudes towards the robot were changed to the better - even slow 
robots will be treated well by people when they are wrapped into 
a human social context ([16]:58). 
As discussed above, a justification of moral consideration to 
robots may rest upon the observation that once we start ascribing 
agency to robots, we may possible become ethical obliged 
towards them. Moreover, the way we treat robots will have an 
impact on our moral habitus. In order to take this into account, I 
choose to  I introduce Kant’s distinction between two kinds of 
duties, as duties to  human beings and duties with regard to non-
human beings and entities [13].  
Consequently, in what follows, I shall be introducing a 
perspective, which of course, within a relational ontology, is 
viewed as flawed due to problems derived from this kind of 
anthropocentric line and its inherent “property approach to moral 
status ascription” [3]. Both Coeckelbergh and Gunkel argue that 
we need to move beyond the assumptions of mind morality 
philosophers. They in particular point to the vagueness of 
metaphysical concepts and the fact that there is no consensus on 
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what these concepts designate. Moreover, complications also arise 
from the fact that we do not have access to others’ minds. Hence, 
the argument goes that we must rethink moral agency and 
patiency by turning to their alternative relational paradigm ([9], 
[3]).  
But, in contrast to their approach, I think that one cannot reject the 
role of metaphysical concepts, such as consciousness, 
intentionality and freedom, with reference to the fact that 
complicated issues have not yet been settled. This would be like 
discharging logic on the basis of Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems.  
Hence, In Facing up the problem of consciousness [2],  Chalmers 
notes that consciousness is the outmost puzzling problem in the 
science of mind ([2]:200). He has coined the terms the easy 
problem and the hard problem of consciousness in referring to the 
fact that we already know about the part of consciousness dealing 
with e.g., our ability to categorize, discriminate, associate and 
recognize patterns. Additionally, over time, our knowledge about 
brain processes will gradually increase, and we will probably end 
up knowing all there is to know about the complexity of the brain. 
This is the easy problem. But, the hard problem of consciousness 
is the problem of experience, that is, to learn why all that 
processing accompanies my consciousness experience. As such, 
mental qualia escape reduction to biophysical matters, and in 
modern dualism, property dualism holds that the mind has two 
fundamentally different types of properties, bio-physical and 
qualia. According to Chalmers, despite interesting and advanced 
cognitive science and reductionist models “the mystery of 
consciousness will not be removed.” ([2]:221). As an alternative, 
Chalmers sets out to outline a nonreductive theory of 
consciousness, which I’ll not go further into here, where I only 
wish to point to Chalmers’ observation that : “The hard problem 
is a hard problem, but there is no reason to believe that it will 
remain permanently unsolved” ([2]:218).  
By itself, the observation that the concepts of mind pose baffling 
problems is no argument for dismissing the project of mind 
philosophy. I argue in favour of re-instantiating the mind-morality 
perspective, which allows me to move on to a Kantian and virtue 
ethical perspective, in which there is room for arguments for 
moral consideration of robots as different from humans, as well as 
from other artifacts or tools.  
Moreover, Kant’s Formula of Humanity reflects a relational 
perspective in describing how we ought to treat others (persons) 
as ends in themselves, where by “ends” Kant means “only the 
concept of an end that is also a duty, a concept that belongs 
exclusively to ethics.[..].” ([13]: 6:389). As such, we can only 
have duties to human beings, since duties require being capable of 
obligation ([13]:192). Meanwhile, Kant’s Tugendlehre [13] allows 
for a description of moral obligations with regard to other beings 
or entities. Actually, Kant gives similar reasons as above in 
emphasizing that a prevalent argument for having indirect duties 
with regard to non-human entities and animals rest upon our 
duties to ourselves: 
“§17 [..] a propensity to wanton destruction of what is beautiful 
in inanimate nature [..] is opposed to a human being’s duty to 
himself; for it weakens and uproots that feeling in hum, which, 
though not of itself moral, is still a disposition of sensibility that 
greatly promotes morality or at least prepares the way for it[..]. 
With regard to the animate but non-rational part of creation, 
violent and cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately 
opposed to a human being’s duty to himself, and he has a duty to 
refrain from this; for it dulls this shared feelings of their suffering 
and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition 
that is very serviceable to morality in one’s relations with other 
men. [..] – Even gratitude for the long service of a horse or dog 
belongs indirectly to a human being’s duty with regard to these 
animals; considered as a direct duty, however, it is always only a 
duty of the human being to himself.”([13]: 6:443) 
Thus, a Kantian perspective, as formulated in his doctrine of 
virtues, enables us to introduce degrees of moral consideration 
along a continuum stretching from, e.g. simple artifacts, such as 
tools, over to, for instance, paintings and historical buildings. We 
have varying degrees of duties with regard to such entities: One 
could say, that I have a duty towards tools, such as for instance 
my garden kit, in the sense that I handle these objects with care, 
i.e.; I clean them after use, oil them when needed and so on. In 
that sense, the practice surrounding gardening includes taking 
proper care of one’s tools, and if I fail to do so, I will either feel 
bad about myself and improve my behavior or continue acting 
carelessly. In that case, others might blame me for neglecting my 
duties as a gardener. Here, we are of course dealing with moral 
consideration in a minimal sense thereof. But, from a virtue 
ethical perspective [15], the way I succeed or fail in my role as a 
gardener is nevertheless important for my personal flourishing.  
Likewise, but on a more serious scale: when confronted with acts 
of vandalism, for instance the destroying of historical buildings by 
Islamic State, we find that such acts are wrongful due to the lack 
of moral consideration to these architectural pearls.  
We do not have duties to animals, but we have duties with regard 
to animals. This is so, primarily because animals deserve moral 
consideration because they can suffer and because the way we 
treat animals will influence our self-perception. Moreover, 
according to MacIntyre: 
“To acknowledge that there are [..] animal preconditions for 
human rationality requires us to think of the relationship of 
human beings to members of other intelligent species in terms of a 
scale or a spectrum rather than of a single line of division 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’” ([15]:55) 
Again, the question arises: what do I, or we, as a moral 
community, become if we abuse animals? This indirect argument 
for moral consideration has been criticized by Coeckelbergh 
[4]:213) with reference to that it seems contra-intuitive to justify 
moral consideration by referring to our own well-being rather than 
to the well-being of the receiver of moral consideration. But, as 
illustrated above, actually both Coeckelbergh and Gunkel stresses 
the importance of a relational turn (social relational ontology) 
with reference to that living with robots will change our lives, 
hence we need to reflect upon what we become from interacting 
with robots. By the relational turn Coeckelbergh de-individualizes 
the concept of a person and holds that we have to be viewed as  
relational entities whose identity depends on their relations with 
other entities ([4]:215).  
In addition Coeckelbergh problematizes the fact that virtue ethics 
faces the problem of application. Hence, we cannot establish, or 
delimit, what the virtues are, which ought to guide our lives, and 
we cannot point out precisely which entities we should grant 
moral consideration by exercising virtuous behavior towards 
them. This is a classic line of argument against virtue ethics, 
which has been countered by Hursthorse [12] in arguing that an 
ethical normative theory does not necessarily have to deliver the 
right answers as such, or, in the case of virtue ethics, provide a 
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complete catalogue of virtues. As such, a plausible normative 
ethical theory should not give us universal rules to guide our 
behavior. Instead, it should be sufficiently flexible to allow for 
different moral outcomes by taking into consideration relevant 
elements in a particular context. Consequently, when faced with 
dilemma situations in real life contexts, it might well be the case 
that two persons solve a dilemma differently. This is not a 
relativist standpoint, since it does not imply disagreement about 
the fact that there is a conflict of values, rather it takes into 
consideration that, in the given context, there might be more than 
one solution, which is in accordance with that, which is virtuous.  
Thus, from a virtue ethical perspective, we develop to become 
what MacIntyre calls independent practical reasoners [15]:158) 
through our upbringing and through participation in moral 
communities, which stand as morally robust and sound practices 
because they are open to critical reflective examination by 
members from in and outside the given community.  
Within this kind of human based social framework, it might still 
be possible to grant moral consideration to robots by introducing a 
continuum on a scale above artifacts - such as tools and things, 
which we handle -  over to animals. Probably below living 
entities, like animals, we may place robots with which we do form 
as if social relations. 
I too hold that living with robots will change our lives. But I doubt 
that we need to take the relational turn.  
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Since, we already by now interact with humanoid robots, and even 
rather simplistic types of robots, as if they were moral agents; we 
ought to start deliberating about moral status. This observation 
might lend support to a relational turn, which allows for viewing 
robots and humans as relational entities, rather than subjects and 
objects, thereby assuming that morality is always already situated 
in the social sphere and phenomenologically rooted in mutual 
dependency between social actors – “relations are prior to the 
things related” ([3]:110). Moreover, we ought to pay attention to 
how human-robot interactions actually unfold, that is, focus on 
appearance or how we apply as if approaches when we enter into 
human-like relations with robots. Thus, if we follow suit with the 
relational turn, we might benefit from not having to struggle with 
the problems of property ascription and mind-morality. Even 
better: Coeckelbergh holds that he does not want to give up on 
folk intuition reflected in the idea that there is a special relation 
between humanity and morality ([5]:181).  
Yet, in the long run, our experiences with robots may radically 
alter our Lebenswelt. Therefore, by taking the relational turn, I 
think we risk losing sight of something of great value to our 
humanity, perhaps without recognizing that this has been the case. 
Instead, I suggest staying within a human-centered framework. 
Here, I present a Kantian relational perspective, which 
distinguishes between others, to whom we have duties, and non-
humans, such as robots, with regard to which we have duties.  
Even though I place myself in (humble) opposition to the work of 
Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, I am deeply inspired by them. 
Compared to their thoroughly analyses in the field of ethics of 
robotics, my contribution represents nothing more than a 
preliminary note. For now, I have no fully fleshed out solution to 
offer regarding how to establish a continuum, which enables us to 
grant various degrees of moral consideration to non-humans. 
Nevertheless, when speaking about robots, I still find it worth 
being anthropocentric for the reasons given above, but also 
bearing in mind that morality is deeply linked with mortality.  
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